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THE VACUITY OF WILKES 
BENJAMIN MEANS* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, corporate governance remains mostly a 
matter of state law.1  Accordingly, to understand how a court will 
resolve a claim of minority shareholder oppression in a closely held 
corporation, we have to know which state’s law applies.2  Depend­
ing upon where a business has been incorporated, any of fifty differ­
ent legal regimes will govern the rights and obligations of its 
shareholders and other stakeholders.3 
However, too much attention to differences among states may 
cause us to lose sight of common themes in shareholder oppression 
law.  As an initial matter, the basic definition of a close corporation 
is substantially similar across jurisdictions—a limited number of 
shareholders, an absence of publicly traded shares, and, typically, 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law; A.B., 
Dartmouth College, J.D., Michigan Law School.  I am grateful to Jim Burkhard, Lisa 
Fairfax, Matt Hall, Susan Kuo, and Doug Moll for their comments and suggestions and 
to Alina Dudau and Richard Simons for their research assistance.  An earlier version of 
this Article was presented as part of the 2010 Southeast Association of Law Schools 
New Scholars program, and I have benefited also from the views of my fellow Sympo­
sium participants. 
1. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon 
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 668 (1974) (describing competition among states for corpo­
rate charters, with Delaware the clear winner).  Some scholars have called for increased 
federal oversight of corporate law rules. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism 
and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1499-1508 (1992); see also Richard A. Booth, The Fall and Rise of 
Federal Corporation Law, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 161, 161 (2007) (“It is quite remarkable 
that corporation law remains the province of the states.” (emphasis omitted)). 
2. In general, shareholder oppression law “attempts to safeguard the close corpo­
ration minority investor from the improper exercise of majority control.”  Douglas K. 
Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Dividend Policy in the Close Corporation, 60 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 841, 844 (2003) [hereinafter Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Dividend 
Policy]. 
3. See, e.g., John H. Matheson & R. Kevin Maler, A Simple Statutory Solution to 
Minority Oppression in the Closely Held Business, 91 MINN. L. REV. 657, 700–09 (2007) 
(surveying the law of all fifty states).  As Matheson and Maler observe, “[e]ach state has 
a unique regime for addressing minority shareholder oppression in closely held busi­
nesses—a surprising state of affairs for such an important area of corporate law.” Id. at 
661. 
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\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE207.txt unknown Seq: 2 27-SEP-11 9:51 
434 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:433 
direct shareholder involvement in management.4  Minority share­
holders in close corporations, unlike their counterparts in public 
corporations, have little practical ability to exit and to recover the 
value of their investment.5  Consequently, minority shareholders 
are particularly vulnerable to mistreatment by controlling share­
holders.6  The problem of shareholder oppression follows from 
these basic features of the close corporation form.7 
Not surprisingly, given the shared dimensions of the problem, 
states have developed similar legal responses that can be grouped 
into representative categories.8  In some states, for instance, op­
pression is couched in the language of tort law: whether the major­
ity shareholders acted “harshly and wrongfully” toward the 
minority.9  Elsewhere, courts ask whether the minority sharehold­
ers have been deprived of the benefit of their contractual bargain.10 
Other courts take a “fiduciary approach” to claims of oppression 
and insist that shareholders in close corporations are essentially 
partners who owe each other stronger fiduciary obligations than 
corporate law would ordinarily require.11 
4. See 1 F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CLOSE  CORPORATIONS 
AND LLCS: LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 1:2, 1:9 (rev. 3d ed. 2010). 
5. See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379 (Del. 1993) (noting that 
“there is no market and no market valuation”); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 
N.E.2d 505, 514 (Mass. 1975) (“In a large public corporation, the oppressed or dissident 
minority stockholder could sell his stock in order to extricate some of his invested capi­
tal.  By definition, this market is not available for shares in the close corporation.”). 
6. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 513 (“The minority is vulnerable to a variety of op­
pressive devices, termed ‘freezeouts,’ which the majority may employ.”). 
7. Benjamin Means, A Voice-Based Framework for Evaluating Claims of Minor­
ity Shareholder Oppression in the Close Corporation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1207, 1218 (2009) 
[hereinafter Means, A Voice-Based Framework]. 
8. See, e.g., Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The 
Unanswered Question of Perspective, 53 VAND. L. REV. 749, 754 (2000) [hereinafter 
Moll, The Unanswered Question of Perspective] (contending that “majority and minor­
ity perspectives” give us a method for sorting state approaches to oppression). 
9. See Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression, 
48 BUS. LAW. 699, 711–12 (1993) [hereinafter Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of 
Action for Oppression] (“Some courts describe oppression as ‘burdensome, harsh and 
wrongful conduct . . . a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing and a viola­
tion of fair play on which every shareholder who entrusts his money to a company is 
entitled to rely.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 
351, 358 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976))). 
10. For a narrow version of this contractual approach, see Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 
A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993), contending that it is incumbent upon minority sharehold­
ers to negotiate for explicit contractual protections and that there is no role for courts 
to create additional, “special” protections. 
11. See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515.  Although breach of fiduciary duty may also 
be tortious, this Article contends that much of the animating force of fiduciary duty can 
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Yet, broad categories can mislead. Individual state approaches 
to shareholder oppression have distinct characteristics; even when 
identical terms are used, they may have different meanings. Fiduci­
ary duty, for instance, is a famously varied concept,12 and notewor­
thy differences exist from state to state regarding the scope of the 
duty, available defenses, and appropriate remedies.13  The danger 
of relying upon analytic categories—a generic “fiduciary ap­
proach,” for one—is that we will oversimplify, leaving out impor­
tant doctrinal details and nuances.  If we hope to evaluate 
shareholder oppression law, we must first understand how courts 
actually resolve claims of shareholder oppression. 
This Symposium offers a welcome corrective to reliance on 
general categories, inviting us to reflect critically upon the thirty-
five-year legacy of a leading Massachusetts case, Wilkes v. Spring-
side Nursing Home, Inc.14  The venerable Wilkes decision is ideally 
suited to serve as a focal point for evaluation of shareholder op­
pression law.15 Wilkes defines the Massachusetts approach to 
shareholder oppression, and Massachusetts has had an indelible in­
fluence on the development of a robust, fiduciary-based response to 
holder oppression, see Benjamin Means, A Contractual Approach to Shareholder Op­
pression Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1161 (2010) [hereinafter Means, A Contractual 
Approach]; see also Douglas K. Moll, Reasonable Expectations v. Implied-in-Fact Con­
tracts: Is the Shareholder Oppression Doctrine Needed?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 989, 1073 
(2001) [hereinafter Moll, Reasonable Expectations v. Implied-in-Fact Contracts] (“[I]t is 
fair to assert that oppression law is doing what contract law should be doing if contract 
law took a broader perspective when identifying and enforcing bargains.”); Robert B. 
Thompson, The Law’s Limits on Contracts in a Corporation, 15 J. CORP. L. 377, 394 
(1990) (“A close corporation is like a long-term relational contract in which benefits for 
all parties necessarily depend on unstated assumptions.  A fully contingent contract 
cannot be drafted, so some ex post settling up by courts is used to support these as­
sumptions.” (footnote omitted)). 
12. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary 
Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 879 (“Fiduciary obligation is one of the most elusive 
concepts in Anglo-American law.”). 
13. Even Delaware, which has refused to recognize “special” protections for mi­
nority shareholders in close corporations, places a fiduciary duty on controlling share­
holders that requires them to demonstrate the entire fairness of any self-dealing 
transactions. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 822 
(2002) (noting that under Delaware law “standard corporate law fiduciary duty princi­
ples constrain the conduct of both directors and controlling shareholders”). 
14. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976). 
15. The Westlaw database reflects, as of October 6, 2010, that Wilkes has been 
cited 776 times. KEYCITE  CITING  REFERENCES: Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 
Inc., Westlaw, www.westlaw.com (search for Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 
353 N.E.2d 657 and following the “Citing References” link) (last visited Oct. 6, 2010). 
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shareholder oppression nationwide.16  Just as the study of public 
corporations often begins with Delaware corporate law, Massachu­
setts law frames the analysis of shareholder oppression in closely 
held corporations.17  Even jurisdictions that reject the fiduciary ap­
proach to shareholder oppression must engage with it,18 and Wilkes 
represents the most prominent and most complete statement of the 
fiduciary approach. 
Wilkes was decided only a year after the Massachusetts Su­
preme Judicial Court first held, in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype 
Co.,19 that “stockholders in the close corporation owe one another 
substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enter­
prise that partners owe to one another.”20  To meet the required 
standard, according to Donahue, shareholders must treat each 
other with the “utmost good faith and loyalty.”21  The Wilkes court 
recognized that Donahue’s absolutist formulation, although appeal­
ing rhetorically, needs clarification.22 
Unfortunately, Wilkes does not deliver the guidance it 
promises. Wilkes instead offers a list of competing considerations. 
We are told that controlling shareholders “may not act out of ava­
rice, expediency or self-interest in derogation of their duty of loy­
alty to the other stockholders”23 but that they “concededly, have 
certain rights to what has been termed ‘selfish ownership’ in the 
corporation” and that these inconsistent concepts must be “bal­
anced.”24  So far, for better or worse, Wilkes provides an ordinary, 
common law standard through which courts might attempt to rec­
16. See, e.g., Hollis v. Hill, 232 F.3d 460, 468-70 (5th Cir. 2000); G & N Aircraft, 
Inc. v. Boehm, 743 N.E.2d 227, 240 (Ind. 2001); Moore v. Me. Indus. Servs., Inc., 645 
A.2d 626, 628 (Me. 1994); Berreman v. West Publ’g Co., 615 N.W.2d 362, 370 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2000); Long v. Atl. PBS, Inc., 681 A.2d 249, 256 n.8 (R.I. 1996). 
17. Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely Held Cor­
porations, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 1099, 1099–1101 (1999). 
18. Riblet Prods. Corp. v. Nagy, 683 A.2d 37, 39 (Del. 1996); Lerner v. Lerner 
Corp., 750 A.2d 709, 721 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000). 
19. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505 
(Mass. 1975). 
20. Id. at 515 (footnotes omitted). 
21. Id. 
22. Unless controlling shareholders must run the corporation in the best interests 
of the minority shareholders, regardless of their own needs and interests, the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty cannot be one of entire selflessness. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing 
Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976) (expressing “concern[ ] that untempered 
application of the strict good faith standard enunciated in Donahue . . . will result in the 
imposition of limitations on legitimate action by the controlling group”). 
23. Id. at 662. 
24. Id. at 663. 
437 
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oncile competing values.25  The court, though, fails to adequately 
explain the key concepts it identifies. 
The court held that controlling shareholders may act in ways 
that disadvantage minority owners, if the controlling group can 
show a “legitimate business purpose,” and if the minority cannot 
establish a less harmful option that would achieve that purpose.26 
However, the court neither made clear what counts as “legitimate” 
nor how close an approximation the minority’s less-harmful option 
must represent.27  Also, without explaining the relevance of share­
holder expectations to its standard, the court observed that adverse 
action could “frustrate the minority stockholder’s purposes in en­
tering . . . the corporate venture.”28  The court’s two-part balancing 
test leaves the most important questions unanswered.  In short, the 
Wilkes test is vacuous. 
And yet, if Wilkes has correctly identified the values at stake in 
a shareholder-oppression case, and if those values really do conflict 
with each other, what methodology would better reconcile them?29 
How would we improve upon Wilkes?  Unless we can appeal to 
some overarching principle when the minority’s interests are jeop­
ardized by the pursuit of otherwise legitimate business purposes, we 
cannot claim that such disputes have a single, correct answer.30  Ac­
ceptable reasons could be adduced for any outcome.  Still, courts 
must in the end decide cases, vindicating certain values at the ex­
pense of others.  The binary structure of legal decision-making re­
quires a result—either the majority has oppressed the minority 
under the relevant legal standard, or it has not. 
25. See, e.g., RICHARD A. COSGROVE, OUR  LADY THE  COMMON  LAW: AN  AN­
GLO-AMERICAN LEGAL COMMUNITY, 1870-1930 39 (1987) (“The common law is not a 
body of rules; it is a method.  It is the creation of law by the inductive process.” (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
26. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663. 
27. Id. (“If called on to settle a dispute, our courts must weigh the legitimate 
business purpose, if any, against the practicability of a less harmful alternative.”). 
28. Id. 
29. As Professor Larry Ribstein observes, by incorporating the parties in Wilkes 
created “the structural dissonance of a ‘partnership’ in corporate form.”  Larry E. Rib-
stein, Close Corporation Remedies and the Evolution of the Closely Held Firm, 33 W. 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 531 (2011). 
30. The difficulty I am describing is by no means unique to shareholder oppres­
sion doctrine. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Hiding the Ball, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1681, 1682 
(1996) (identifying conflicting constitutional interpretations and stating that “one could 
repeat this exercise in the plurality of legal meaning with just about any interesting 
piece of common or statutory law”). 
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Given the constraints of the judicial role, Wilkes deserves 
credit for resisting the temptation to simplify shareholder oppres­
sion disputes, even if its time-honored legal response—the deploy­
ment of a balancing metaphor—leaves too many issues under­
explored.31  This Article contends that a more developed theory of 
reasonable expectations would help clarify the Wilkes approach by 
offering an appropriate threshold inquiry.  To decide whether a mi­
nority shareholder’s expectation is reasonable, courts should ask 
whether there exists a shared understanding among shareholders 
(even if unwritten and unspoken) that the majority has violated.32 
A contractual approach to shareholder oppression, building on 
Wilkes’s acknowledgment of the importance of reasonable share­
holder expectations,33 would advance the task Wilkes set for itself: 
the articulation of a powerful but fair standard for protecting mi­
nority shareholders that does not prevent controlling shareholders 
from pursuing legitimate business purposes.34 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I argues that Wilkes 
fails to provide a clear standard for assessing claims of shareholder 
31. In his contribution to this Symposium, Professor Lyman Johnson notes that 
Wilkes’s approach is consistent with the methodology courts have long used to resolve 
disputes concerning our most fundamental values. See Lyman Johnson, Enduring Eq­
uity in the Close Corporation, 33 W. NEW  ENG. L. REV. 313 (2011) (“Balancing, of 
course, is a longstanding mainstay of constitutional law analysis, where competing inter­
ests are weighed against each other and the relative strengths of each are assessed.”). 
32. In many disputes, asking what the shareholders’ actual bargain was will go a 
long way toward determining whether there has been a breach of fiduciary duty. See, 
e.g., Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 N.E.2d 351, 355 (Mass. 1996). However, not all 
claims of shareholder oppression turn on the nature of the parties’ bargain; the majority 
can abuse its control even as to matters entirely beyond the parties’ contemplation. One 
might still consider what the parties would have bargained for had they considered the 
issue, but “[h]ypothetical contract is a welfare norm asserted by an academic.  It is not a 
transactional artifact.”  William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Con­
tractual Corporation, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 180, 192 (1992). 
33. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 664.  Massachusetts courts have increasingly used ex­
pectations analysis. See infra Part III.C. 
34. See Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663.  Fiduciary duty and contractual norms are (or 
can be) related concepts. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 
166 (2010) (“[C]ontrolling shareholders should not have fiduciary duties to noncontrol­
ling shareholders . . . .  [T]he law need only constrain opportunism by holding the con­
troller to its express or implied contractual obligations, including the duty of good 
faith . . . .”); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & JEFFREY M. LIPSHAW, UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS 
ENTITIES 219 (4th ed. 2009) (“Fiduciary and good faith duties may be difficult to distin­
guish in practice.”); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and 
Fiduciary Duty, 36 J. L. & ECON. 425, 427 (1993) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, 
Contract and Fiduciary Duty]  (“[A] ‘fiduciary’ relation is a contractual one character­
ized by unusually high costs of specification and monitoring. The duty of loyalty re­
places detailed contractual terms . . . .”). 
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oppression.  Part II uses the facts of Donahue to illustrate Wilkes’s 
indeterminacy.  Part III contends that the Massachusetts courts, 
even with the benefit of more than three decades of experience, 
have not satisfactorily answered the questions that Wilkes left open. 
Part IV contends that reasonable expectations analysis could give 
the Wilkes test more specific content by encouraging the courts to 
evaluate the legitimacy of the controlling shareholders’ purpose in 
the context of the parties’ actual bargain.35  Part V concludes, how­
ever, that not all values at stake in a shareholder oppression claim 
are contractual. Wilkes’s engagement with complexity is a signal 
contribution. 
I. THE ROAD TO WILKES 
Most jurisdictions protect minority shareholders from oppres­
sion,36 notwithstanding the opposition of commentators who fault 
shareholders who failed to negotiate adequately before investing.37 
Some courts use common law doctrines to protect minority share­
holders;38 elsewhere, there are specific statutory provisions in the 
35. Unlike the you-made-your-bed-now-you-must-lie-in-it approach advocated by 
some scholars, see, for example, Paula J. Dalley, The Misguided Doctrine of Stock­
holder Fiduciary Duties, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 175 (2004), this kind of contractual analy­
sis would take account of the parties’ ongoing relationship and the necessary 
incompleteness of any long-term contract. See Means, A Contractual Approach, supra 
note 11.  At the same time, the analysis would require something more than “the minor- R 
ity’s reasonable expectations of benefit from their ownership of shares.” Brodie v. Jor­
dan, 857 N.E.2d 1076, 1080 (Mass. 2006) (finding liability without inquiring as to 
whether minority shareholder had any specific expectation with respect to the matter at 
issue—that the corporation would provide a valuation of its shares at its own expense). 
36. Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression and the Limited Liability Company: 
Learning (or not) from Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 883 
(2005) (“[J]udicial precedents and statutory provisions in many jurisdictions afford 
some protection to the close corporation minority investor from the improper exercise 
of majority control.”); see also Sandra K. Miller, Should the Definition of Oppressive 
Conduct by Majority Shareholders Exclude a Consideration of Ethical Conduct and Bus­
iness Purpose?, 97 DICK. L. REV. 227 (1993) (“Many states have adopted remedial leg­
islation to address the special needs of the minority shareholder of a closely-held 
corporation.” (footnote omitted)). 
37. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 830 (“[P]arties who want liberal dis- R 
solution rights may bargain for them . . . before investing.”); Edward B. Rock & 
Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority 
Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORP. L. 913, 915 (1999) (“[T]he question [is] 
what, if anything, the courts should do for the minority shareholders in cases where the 
parties have not provided for the problem by contract.  Our basic answer is that courts 
should not do anything except enforce the participants’ contracts and vigorously pre­
vent non pro rata distributions to shareholders.” (footnote omitted)). 
38. See Matheson & Maler, supra note 3, at 662 (noting that “some states have 
developed relief for minority oppression as a matter of common law jurisprudence”). 
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corporate code that enable oppressed shareholders to seek dissolu­
tion as a remedy.39  At the heart of the Massachusetts common law 
approach to shareholder oppression is the view that shareholders 
owe each other a fiduciary duty of loyalty akin to that owed by 
partners.  Part I.A contends that the fiduciary approach, first articu­
lated in Donahue, appeared to nullify the majority’s ability to make 
necessary business decisions.  Part I.B shows that the court’s effort 
in Wilkes to better define the parameters of fiduciary duty was a 
mixed success, limiting the reach of fiduciary duty at the expense of 
the doctrine’s internal coherence. 
A. The Duty of Utmost Good Faith and Loyalty 
In Donahue, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court de­
scribed the minority shareholder’s predicament.40  Under basic 
rules of corporate law, the majority shareholders elect the board of 
directors.41  In turn, the directors have the power to decide whether 
value will be returned to shareholders through dividends and who 
will be employed by the business.42  These powers can be used to 
freeze out minority shareholders, so that they receive no benefit 
from their stock ownership.43  Unlike their public corporation 
39. See id. at 665-69 (describing evolution of the statutory approach to share­
holder oppression).  Depending on the jurisdiction, the dissolution statute may also give 
courts the flexibility to award other kinds of equitable relief. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 
14A:12-7(1)(c) (West 2003) (authorizing equitable remedies short of dissolution). 
40. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975). The 
court held that “a close corporation [is] typified by: (1) a small number of stockholders; 
(2) no ready market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder 
participation in the management . . . of the corporation.” Id. 
41. DOUGLAS K. MOLL & ROBERT A. RAGAZZO, THE  LAW OF  CLOSELY HELD 
CORPORATIONS § 3.01, at 3-3 (2009) (“According to [the traditional model of corporate 
governance], shareholders vote for directors but otherwise have little role in managing 
the corporation.”); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.05 (1984). 
42. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 192–94 (“Under all corporation statutes, the R 
board of directors is the key player in the formal decisionmaking structure.”); MOLL & 
RAGAZZO, supra note 41, § 7.01[A], at 7-4 (“Traditionally, most corporate power is R 
centralized in the hands of a board of directors.”); see also MODEL  BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 8.01(b). 
43. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 514.  An authoritative study of such “freeze-outs” 
enumerates some of the possibilities: 
“The squeezers [those who employ the freeze-out techniques] may refuse to 
declare dividends; they may drain off the corporation’s earnings in the form of 
exorbitant salaries and bonuses to the majority shareholder-officers and per­
haps to their relatives, or in the form of high rent by the corporation for prop­
erty leased from majority shareholders . . . ; they may deprive minority 
shareholders of corporate offices and of employment by the company . . . .” 
Id. at 513 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting F.H. O’NEAL & J. DER­
WIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, 42 (1961)). 
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counterparts, minority shareholders in close corporations are 
locked in with no practical ability to exit by selling their shares and 
investing elsewhere.44 
The court further reasoned that a close corporation often re­
sembles a partnership45 and that the stockholders in a close corpo­
ration “‘clothe’ their partnership ‘with the benefits peculiar to a 
corporation, limited liability, perpetuity and the like.’”46  There­
fore, to address the problem of shareholder oppression, the court 
imported partnership concepts into corporate law for the protection 
of minority shareholders.47  While shareholders in corporations do 
not ordinarily owe one another fiduciary duties, the Donahue court 
held that shareholders in close corporations owe a fiduciary duty of 
“utmost good faith and loyalty.”48 
According to the court, the majority shareholders violated 
their fiduciary duty because they refused to repurchase the shares 
of a minority shareholder on the same terms made available to a 
former majority shareholder who wished to retire.49  Euphemia 
Donahue, the plaintiff, was the widow of a former vice president of 
the corporation and a minority shareholder.50  The former majority 
shareholder had already given the bulk of his stock to his children, 
and they caused the corporation to repurchase the remaining stock 
in connection with his resignation as a director.51  The court held 
44. See Rock & Wachter, supra note 37, at 916; Thompson, The Shareholder’s R 
Cause of Action for Oppression, supra note 9, at 699 (observing that minority share- R 
holders are “vulnerable in a way that is distinct from the risk faced by investors in 
public corporations”).  In a close corporation, there is no active secondary market for 
stock, making it more difficult to locate a willing buyer and to ascertain the market 
value.  An outside investor will hesitate to accept a minority position in a corporation 
owned by strangers, especially if it appears that shareholder relations have broken 
down. See Paul G. Mahoney, Trust and Opportunism in Close Corporations, in CON­
CENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 177, 180 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000) (observing 
that a minority shareholder “may sell to a third party, of course, but, if his desire to exit 
stems from opportunistic behavior by the minority, the purchase price will reflect the 
behavior and therefore provide neither recompense nor deterrence”). 
45. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 512 (“Just as in a partnership, the relationship among 
the stockholders must be one of trust, confidence and absolute loyalty if the enterprise 
is to succeed.”). 
46. Id. (quoting In re Surchin v. Approved Bus. Mach. Co., 286 N.Y.S.2d 580, 581 
(Sup. Ct. 1967)). 
47. Id. at 515. 
48. Id. at 515, 518. 
49. Id. at 520.  The corporation had repurchased the shares of a departing stock­
holder, negotiated in connection with his departure from the business and his transfer 
of control to his children. Id. at 511. 
50. Id. at 508. 
51. Id. at 510. 
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that “if the stockholder whose shares were purchased was a mem­
ber of the controlling group, the controlling stockholders must 
cause the corporation to offer each stockholder an equal opportu­
nity to sell a ratable number of his shares to the corporation at an 
identical price.”52 
Under the Donahue rule of equal opportunity, it does not mat­
ter if the corporation has a good reason for repurchasing only some 
of its outstanding stock.53  Nor does it matter whether the minority 
had any bargained-for expectation of selling its stock to the corpo­
ration at fair value.54  According to one commentator, “Donahue 
used language so broad as to imply that the majority must always 
subordinate their interests to those of the minority.”55 
The Donahue court distinguished its approach from the “some­
what less stringent standard of fiduciary duty to which directors and 
stockholders of all corporations must adhere in the discharge of 
their corporate responsibilities.”56  In an effort to describe “[t]he 
more rigorous duty of partners and participants in a joint adven­
ture,” the court quoted extensively from Justice Cardozo’s famous 
articulation of fiduciary duty in Meinhard v. Salmon: 
“Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the 
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty.  Many forms 
of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at 
arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. . . . 
Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensi­
tive, is then the standard of behavior.”57 
However, strict fiduciary duties create a dilemma: in a corpora­
tion, let alone in a partnership, it is hard to know what “the punc­
tilio of an honor the most sensitive” requires when difficult business 
decisions must be made.58  Without the ability to adapt to unfore­
seen circumstances, a business cannot survive; without the right to 
52. Id. at 518. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 515 (“When the minority stockholder agrees to sell out at less than fair 
value, the majority has won.”). 
55. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 818; see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death R 
of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1688 (1990) (“The 
application of strict fiduciary standards to close corporations deprives controlling share­
holders of the ability to manage the corporation—to use their own property—as they 
see fit.”). 
56. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515-16 (footnote omitted). 
57. Id. at 516 (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (alter­
ation in original)). 
58. Id. (quoting Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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benefit from ownership, investors would have no incentive to take a 
controlling stake in a business venture. 
Commentators were quick to identify the vagueness inherent 
in the Donahue approach to fiduciary duty.  As the editors of the 
Harvard Law Review noted in a review of recent cases for 1975­
1976: 
The court’s exhortation makes it clear that Massachusetts courts 
can be expected to supervise more carefully at least some busi­
ness decisions of close corporations; but which decisions those 
may be cannot readily be determined because of the abstract na­
ture of the court’s announced principle.59 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged this 
criticism, and, as discussed in the next section, the court responded 
in Wilkes by more carefully describing its views concerning the na­
ture of fiduciary duty.60 
B. The Legitimate Business Purposes of Selfish Owners 
The facts set forth in Wilkes are straightforward: four equal 
shareholders owned and operated a nursing home, all were found­
ing investors, all shared profits equally through salary and divided 
work responsibilities evenly.61  After a falling out, three of the 
shareholders decided to fire the fourth, Wilkes, and to keep the 
value of the investment for themselves.62  No messy family compli­
cations were involved, and the court does not mention any offset­
ting bad behavior on the part of the minority shareholder.63 
Further augmenting the aura of disloyalty is the fact that Wilkes 
59. Recent Cases: Corporations—Close Corporations—Stockholders’ Duty of “Ut­
most Good Faith and Loyalty” Requires Controlling Shareholder Selling a Close Corpo­
ration its Own Shares to Cause the Corporation to Offer to Purchase a Ratable Number 
of Shares from Minority—Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 75 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1295, 
328 N.E.2d 505 (1975), 89 HARV. L. REV. 423, 428 (1976) [hereinafter Recent Cases]. 
60. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976) 
(“Therefore, when minority stockholders in a close corporation bring suit against the 
majority alleging a breach of the strict good faith duty owed to them by the majority, we 
must carefully analyze the action taken by the controlling stockholders in the individual 
case.”). Wilkes does not address the further criticism “that a relationship of ‘trust and 
confidence’ does not in fact exist in all corporations that are closely held” and that 
“imposition of a citizenship concept may be contrary to the intentions of the sharehold­
ers.” Recent Cases, supra note 59, at 427-28. R 
61. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 659-60. 
62. Id. at 661. 
63. Indeed, the falling out seems to have involved Wilkes’s negotiation of a better 
deal for the business, limiting a co-owner’s ability to self-deal. See id. at 660 (“Wilkes 
was successful in prevailing on the other stockholders of Springside to procure a higher 
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devised the plan for a nursing-home business, and he brought the 
other three shareholders on board as investors and participants; 
they had shut him out of a business that would not have existed 
without his efforts and creative vision.64 
Given those facts, the court might have applied Donahue’s “ut­
most good faith and loyalty” test and concluded without much 
trouble that terminating the employment of the person who 
founded the business, and who continued to do his part, falls well 
short of the required standard of utmost loyalty.65  Instead, al­
though the court reaffirmed Donahue,66 it also took the opportu­
nity to clarify the fiduciary duty standard. The court acknowledged 
a “concern[ ] that untempered application of the strict good faith 
standard” might “unduly hamper” the majority’s ability to manage 
the business and stated that “[t]he majority, concededly, have cer­
tain rights to what has been termed ‘selfish ownership’ in the 
corporation.”67 
Specifically, in order to “temper” the application of good faith, 
Wilkes invented a two-part test that balances the majority’s right of 
selfish ownership “against . . . their fiduciary obligation to the mi­
nority.”68  The Wilkes test first asks “whether the controlling group 
can demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for its action.”69 
sale price for the property than Quinn apparently anticipated paying or desired to 
pay.”). 
64. Id. at 659.  This is a recurring issue for venture capital financing. See Robert 
Sprague & Karen L. Page, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the Entre­
preneur: Protecting Naive Issuers from Sophisticated Investors, 8 WYO. L. REV. 167, 167 
(2008) (“There is evidence suggesting . . . that in the sphere of new ventures, the bal­
ance of power may be tipped in favor of the investors and away from the issuers.  In­
deed, it is often the case that entrepreneurs, though expert in their substantive field, 
tend to be naı̈ve in financial and business matters.  Investors, particularly venture capi­
talists, on the other hand, tend to be experienced and knowledgeable in financial 
matters.”). 
65. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 818 (“Under Donahue, this is an easy R 
case.”).  The fact that an individual is a founding shareholder does not guarantee em­
ployment, however, particularly where the parties have explicitly contracted for a dif­
ferent arrangement. See M. Todd Henderson, The Story of Dodge v. Ford Motor 
Company: Everything Old is New Again, in CORPORATE  LAW  STORIES 46 (J. Mark 
Ramseyer ed., 2009) (“A good product can survive mismanagement precisely because 
investors have control rights that give them the power to change management, even 
when the manager is the entrepreneur without whom the company would not even 
exist.”). 
66. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 661-62. 
67. Id. at 663. 
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Then, if the majority meets its burden, “it is open to minority stock­
holders to demonstrate that the same legitimate objective could 
have been achieved through an alternative course of action less 
harmful to the minority’s interest.”70  The court’s role is to “weigh 
the legitimate business purpose, if any, against the practicability of 
a less harmful alternative.”71 
Central to Wilkes’s analytic framework is the requirement that 
controlling shareholders demonstrate a “legitimate business pur­
pose” for challenged conduct that disadvantages minority share­
holders.72  The Wilkes court did not offer a definition but 
“acknowledge[d] the fact that the controlling group in a close cor­
poration must have some room to maneuver in establishing the bus­
iness policy of the corporation.”73  As examples, the court 
mentioned business decisions concerning dividends, salary, and 
employment.74 
Applying this standard, the court found that there was no legit­
imate business purpose for terminating Wilkes and that “[t]he sev­
erance of Wilkes from the payroll resulted not from misconduct or 
neglect of duties, but because of the personal desire of [his fellow 
shareholders] to prevent him from continuing to receive money 
from the corporation.”75  Because the majority lacked a legitimate 
business purpose, there was no need to consider alternatives to the 
minority shareholder’s termination.76  Of crucial importance for the 
court was the fact that the majority’s actions “assured that Wilkes 
would receive no return at all from the corporation.”77  Thus, 
Wilkes set forth a novel approach to evaluating claims of minority 
shareholder oppression, but it did so in a case involving facts that 
did not require the court to reach the second step of its own 
analysis. 
Wilkes fails to explain what makes a business purpose legiti­
mate, leaving even the first step’s application uncertain in future 
cases.  For instance, can there be a business purpose for terminating 
the minority’s employment based on personal or family disagree­
ments?  One might interpret Wilkes to hold that shareholder per­
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. See id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 661. 
76. See id. at 663-64. 
77. Id. at 664. 
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sonality conflicts do not warrant adverse actions against a minority 
shareholder, unless the minority shareholder intends to damage the 
business through disruptive conduct.78  On the other hand, person­
ality disputes can interfere with normal business operations as 
much as any other conflict; squabbling shareholders can cripple a 
corporation even if no shareholder desires that result and all share­
holders seek only to advance their own view of how best to advance 
the business.79 
The remainder of the Wilkes test also lacks specific content. 
Courts are instructed to balance business purposes with alternative 
courses of action but are given no guidance in identifying reasona­
ble alternatives or in assigning weights to different possible courses 
of action.80  Finally, Wilkes included discussion of the parties’ ex­
pectations81 but did not formally connect the expectations of share­
holders to the two-part test it developed. We know that 
shareholder expectations may matter, but not when they matter or 
how. 
II. DONAHUE REVISITED 
One way to highlight unresolved issues in Wilkes is to apply 
the two-part test to more difficult facts—those of Donahue, for in­
stance.  Setting aside the fact that Wilkes reaffirmed Donahue, and 
thus appeared to endorse Donahue’s equal opportunity rule, at 
least in the context of selective share repurchase arrangements, the 
Wilkes test could be used to argue for a different outcome.  Unlike 
the equal opportunity rule, the Wilkes test does not dictate a result. 
Under the first step of the Wilkes analysis, the controlling 
shareholders in Donahue could have argued that there was a legiti­
mate business purpose for the share repurchase plan—removing a 
semi-retired member who had the ability to influence corporate 
policies and to block efforts to build for the future.82  Acquiring his 
78. Id. (“There was no showing of misconduct on Wilkes’s part as a director, of­
ficer or employee of the corporation which would lead us to approve the majority ac­
tion as a legitimate response to the disruptive nature of an undesirable individual bent 
on injuring or destroying the corporation.”). 
79. For conflicting court opinions, see infra Part III.A. 
80. See infra Part III.B. 
81. See Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 662-63. 
82. O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 7:3, at 7-16 (“A buyout agreement tied R 
to a shareholder’s retirement or withdrawal from the business can work to insure that 
the corporation will continue to be owned by those who are actively involved in the 
business and thereby reduce potential conflict between active and passive 
shareholders.”). 
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shares would set the foundation for stable management of the cor­
poration.  The problems for corporate governance posed by retired 
shareholders are well understood, and it is not uncommon for close 
corporations to have mandatory repurchase agreements in place.83 
Some commentators have argued that the majority’s stated purpose 
was legitimate and justified its actions.84 
On the other hand, the plaintiff, Ms. Donahue, might have re­
sponded that arranging special liquidity for an exiting shareholder 
who was the father of the next generation of managers was more 
about family loyalty than business justification.  Also, if the control­
ling shareholders owed her a duty of the utmost loyalty, and if the 
definition of fiduciary duty adopted in Donahue and affirmed in 
Wilkes explicitly rejects the sort of arm’s length “conduct permissi­
ble in a workaday world,”85 she might have argued that something 
more than a mere commercial purpose would be necessary to justify 
the repurchase of only a majority shareholder’s stock.  Arguments 
along these lines expose a conflict between the values of efficient 
governance and shareholder loyalty. Wilkes recognizes the impor­
tance of both values, but does not explain how they are to be recon­
ciled in determining whether the majority has established a 
legitimate business purpose for its actions. 
Nor is it clear how the second step of the Wilkes analysis would 
apply to Donahue.  On what basis do we decide whether a less 
harmful alternative is reasonably available?  One can imagine many 
approaches to this problem.86  Perhaps the issue is whether buying 
out all shareholders who wished to tender their shares would cause 
the corporation to go bankrupt or to lose out on important business 
83. 2 F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF  MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS § 6:11, at 6-35 (rev. 2d ed. 2005) (“Restrictions 
are commonly placed on the transferability of stock in close corporations . . . and are 
often accompanied by buyback agreements permitting or requiring the purchaser of a 
shareholder’s stock triggered by . . . retirement. . . .”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel 
R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 294 (1986) 
(“Buy-out arrangements on contingencies such as retirement are common in closely 
held corporations.”). 
84. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 83, at 295 (“The purchase appears to 
have been nothing more than an attempt to facilitate the retirement of a manager who, 
by virtue of advancing age and poor health, could no longer contribute.”). 
85. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 516 (Mass. 1975) (quoting 
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)). 
86. See, e.g., Moll, The Unanswered Question of Perspective, supra note 8, at 773 R 
(noting that the import of the Wilkes test “depends upon what the courts will consider a 
less harmful alternative” and that a cost-insensitive approach would be very different 
than one that required the alternative to be “equally feasible and cost-effective to the 
corporation”). 
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opportunities; or maybe a less serious but still significant economic 
difficulty would suffice.87  Even if the standard were clear, a court 
would have to inform itself about the corporation’s financial posi­
tion and its future prospects in order to evaluate the appropriate­
ness of a complex business judgment. 
In sum, although Wilkes explicitly affirms Donahue, its own 
analytic framework would seem to permit a finding for either the 
plaintiff or the defendants.88  Certainly, the defendants could have 
made facially plausible arguments that the share repurchase was 
supported by a valid business purpose and that the alternative of 
repurchasing everyone’s shares was not reasonably practicable. 
Wilkes holds that legitimate business interests must be balanced 
with reasonably available alternatives,89 but it does not say how 
these concepts are to be identified or how the balancing should be 
performed. 
III. THE AFTERMATH OF WILKES 
Despite its reworking of Donahue’s vague fiduciary command, 
Wilkes has itself engendered uncertainty, and the Supreme Judicial 
Court’s more recent decisions have not resolved fundamental ques­
tions of interpretation.  To be clear, this is not a criticism of the 
outcome in any particular case.  Nor do I mean to insist upon a 
standard that can be applied mechanically.  In a common law sys­
tem it is not unusual for courts to consider all relevant facts and to 
allow the legal principles to reveal themselves over time, as when a 
sculptor carves away everything that does not belong in the finished 
image.90  Rather, the question is whether Massachusetts’s approach 
to shareholder oppression law satisfies the requirement that law 
87. Notably, the majority shareholders did inform Ms. Donahue “that the corpo­
ration would not purchase the shares and was not in a financial position to do so.” 
Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 511. 
88. Indeed, we have not even touched upon the variety of arguments that might 
be made about the shareholders’ expectations, since the Wilkes test does not formally 
include expectations analysis. 
89. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976). 
90. See, e.g., Wayne R. Barnes, Contemplating a Civil Law Paradigm for a Future 
International Commercial Code, 65 LA. L. REV. 677, 692 (2005) (“The common law 
system has been described as the process of applying rules derived from case prece­
dents, to new factual situations, all for the purpose of producing uniform, consistent, 
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“be intelligible to law enforcers and law subjects and that justifica­
tions be public.”91  Put more simply, what does Wilkes mean? 
A satisfactory interpretation would need to resolve three diffi­
culties: the absence of a clear standard for identifying a legitimate 
business purpose; the absence of any standard for evaluating less-
harmful alternatives; and, more recently, varying approaches to rea­
sonable expectations analysis. 
A. What is a Legitimate Business Purpose? 
Under the Wilkes standard, majority shareholders might as­
sume that they have the ability to fire a manager for poor perform­
ance, even if the manager also owns shares in the corporation. The 
right of selfish ownership, if it is to have substance, necessarily in­
cludes latitude to take reasonable steps to protect the value of the 
majority’s investment in the corporation. Yet, Wilkes’s acknowl­
edgment that the majority “must have some room to maneuver”92 
does not indicate whether a minority shareholder can be terminated 
for poor performance, even in an at-will employment jurisdiction. 
After all, as the court noted in Wilkes, permitting the majority to 
terminate a shareholder employee may “effectively frustrate the 
minority stockholder’s purposes in entering on the corporate ven­
ture and also deny him an equal return on his investment.”93 
Taking a narrow view, the Supreme Judicial Court held in 
Pointer v. Castellani that it was a breach of fiduciary duty to remove 
the president of a corporation, even though he had twice violated 
the terms of a loan covenant with the corporation’s principal 
lender, thereby exposing the corporation to the risk of bankruptcy, 
and notwithstanding the fact that the other shareholders had lost 
faith in his ability to manage the business on a profitable basis.94 
On one occasion, the president had caused another business he co­
owned to lend money to the corporation at very high interest 
rates.95  Moreover, he had failed to disclose information about side 
91. Kenneth W. Simons, Justification in Private Law, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 698, 
741 (1996) (reviewing ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE  IDEA OF  PRIVATE  LAW (1995)). To 
avoid the problem of indeterminacy, it is not necessary to enable a court to “mechani­
cally derive detailed norms from more general ones.  Still, one would expect a justifying 
theory of law to give considerable guidance.” Id. at 739. 
92. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663. 
93. Id. at 662-63. 
94. Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 813-14 (Mass. 2009). Although the case 
involved an LLC, Massachusetts does not appear to distinguish between LLCs and 
close corporations for purposes of shareholder oppression analysis. Id. at 815. 
95. Id. at 813. 
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real-estate ventures before recommending that the corporation sell 
its property to his other venture at what turned out to be a low 
value.96 
To be sure, there was another side to the story in Pointer.  The 
plaintiff had plausible explanations for all the actions that led to his 
removal.  For instance, the parties had agreed that they had the 
right to conduct competing business and, as the lower court found, 
“no one . . . other than [plaintiff] had any interest in real estate 
development.”97  But the question relevant to step one of the 
Wilkes analysis is not whether the majority’s actions were indispu­
tably correct, or whether some course of action less harmful to the 
minority’s interests might have been pursued, but whether the ma­
jority shareholders could articulate a legitimate business purpose 
for the challenged conduct.98  The majority shareholders wanted to 
put a manager in place that they trusted, yet the court found that 
this violated their fiduciary duty to the minority shareholder.99 
By contrast, in Holland v. Burke, a Massachusetts Superior 
Court Judge recently held that, notwithstanding a minority share­
holder’s “expectation that he would continue to participate in cor­
porate decisions,” there was “credible evidence [that] established a 
breakdown over time of the relationship between [plaintiff] on the 
one hand and the other three shareholders with respect to the day-
to-day operations of the two inns and the long-term goal of the ven­
ture.”100  Although there was no showing that plaintiff was unwill­
ing to perform his job,101 or that he intended to damage the 
business in any way, a personality conflict with the other sharehold­
ers warranted his removal.102 
96. Id. at 811-12. 
97. Id. at 818. 
98. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663. 
99. Pointer, 918 N.E.2d at 816-17; see also Leslie v. Boston Software Collabora­
tive, Inc., No. 010268BLS, 2002 WL 532605, at *8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 2002) 
(holding that although plaintiff “was hardly a model employee” his termination was not 
justified because, “as a founder and a nearly one-third minority shareholder, he was 
entitled to the utmost good faith and fair dealing”). The plaintiff in Leslie had been 
known to carry a licensed firearm to the office and his termination followed an e-mail 
message interpreted by the defendants as a threat of violence. Id. at *4 (referencing e-
mail message describing plaintiff’s wife’s statement that “‘[s]he reserves the right to 
shoot Bob and (or) Mark at a moments [sic] notice or at a minimum to severely injure 
them for what they are putting her through’” (second alteration in original)). 
100. Holland v. Burke, No. BACV2005-00122A, 2008 WL 4959050 (Mass. Super. 
Ct. June 18, 2008). 
101. Id.  The court observed that the plaintiff “was an articulate and principled 
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The Holland court distinguished Wilkes, stating that the major­
ity’s primary goal did not appear to be “to prevent [plaintiff] from 
continuing to receive money from the corporations.”103  However, 
there were also striking similarities.  First, the alleged freeze-out in 
both cases occurred after the plaintiff had proposed that the other 
shareholders buy out his interest in the business.104  Second, in Hol­
land and Wilkes, the termination of the plaintiff’s employment 
meant that he received no value going forward for his “25% inter­
est.”105  Third, the dispute in both cases had to do as much with 
clashing personalities as with any disagreement regarding business 
objectives.106  The court in Wilkes emphasized that “[t]here was no 
showing of misconduct on Wilkes’s part as a director, officer or em­
ployee of the corporation which would lead us to approve the ma­
jority action as a legitimate response to the disruptive nature of an 
undesirable individual bent on injuring or destroying the corpora­
tion.”107  Likewise, the record in Holland did not suggest any im­
proper motive or conduct on the part of the plaintiff.108 
In both Pointer and Holland, then, one could as easily use the 
Wilkes analysis to support the opposite result. The legitimacy of a 
business purpose depends upon the court’s judgment, and, as these 
cases suggest, that judgment may vary substantially from case to 
case.  The central problem is not factual ambiguity, but rather the 
103. Id. 
104. Id. (“Holland proposed that he would surrender all of his shares for a total 
price of $750,000.”); cf. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 660­
61 (Mass. 1976) (“Wilkes . . . gave notice of his intention to sell his shares for an amount 
based on an appraisal of their value.”). 
105. Holland, 2008 WL 4959050 (“None of the entities has ever declared divi­
dends.”); Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 664 (“Most important is the plain fact that the cutting 
off of Wilkes’s salary, together with the fact that the corporation never declared a divi­
dend . . . assured that Wilkes would receive no return at all from the corporation.” 
(internal citation omitted)). 
106. Holland, 2008 WL 4959050 (identifying as “a legitimate business purpose for 
removing Holland as a director and officer . . . credible evidence [that] established a 
breakdown over time of the relationship between Holland on the one hand and the 
other three shareholders with respect to the day-to-day operations of the two inns and 
the long-term goal of the venture”); Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 661 (“Despite a continuing 
deterioration in his personal relationship with his associates, Wilkes had consistently 
endeavored to carry on his responsibilities to the corporation in the same satisfactory 
manner and with the same degree of competence he had previously shown.”). 
107. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 664. 
108. Holland, 2008 WL 4959050.  If anything, the dispute arose as a result of al­
leged mismanagement on the part of the other shareholders. See id. (“He was at odds 
with the other shareholders with respect to [their] company sponsored trips to Mexico, 
inattention and accountability issues, and a general distaste for the others’ collective 
approach to running a business.”). 
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legal standard’s indeterminacy. According to Wilkes, legitimacy in­
volves the perceived needs of the business, the selfish ownership 
rights of the majority, and the duty of utmost loyalty, which is 
sometimes described expansively as a principle of equal return on 
investment.  Not all of these interests can be vindicated at the same 
time in every case. 
B. What Alternatives Must the Majority Consider? 
Even if courts could satisfactorily define the parameters of a 
legitimate business purpose, Wilkes charges them with the addi­
tional task of evaluating the suitability of alternative courses of ac­
tion.109  The Wilkes court left open whether cost is no object, of 
some import, or whether an alternative must be “equally feasible 
and cost-effective to the corporation.”110  Further complicating 
matters, Wilkes separated the threshold business purpose analysis 
from the identification of alternatives, even though the two analyses 
intertwine.111  It is hard to decide in a vacuum whether a business 
decision was legitimate, and alternative choices may inform our un­
derstanding of the majority’s actual decision.  Obviously, if an 
equally affordable and effective means of achieving the majority’s 
stated purpose is eschewed in favor of a course of action that causes 
harm to the minority, that foregone option is strong circumstantial 
evidence that the majority intended to harm the minority or was 
indifferent to the prospect. 
However, there are countless alternatives that might be posited 
in hindsight to any particular business decision.  In many cases, a 
suggested alternative will involve additional expense for the corpo­
ration,112 and it will be unclear whether the alternative would have 
successfully accomplished the business purpose. The business judg­
ment rule, which insulates most corporate decisions from share­
holder challenge, recognizes that this kind of second-guessing 
invites litigation and reduces the value of the corporate enterprise 
109. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663.  This difficulty will be felt, not only by courts, but 
also by well-intentioned majority shareholders seeking to manage their businesses with­
out oppressing minority shareholders in violation of Massachusetts law. 
110. Moll, The Unanswered Question of Perspective, supra note 8, at 773. R 
111. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663.  Under the Wilkes test, defendants bear the bur­
den of showing a legitimate business purpose; then, and only then, does plaintiff have 
the burden of showing reasonably practicable alternatives. Id. 
112. See Moll, The Unanswered Question of Perspective, supra note 8, at 774 (dis- R 
cussing hypothetical situation where minority shareholder challenges withholding of 
dividends by pointing out that immediate business needs could have been satisfied by 
borrowing money). 
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for all investors; timid, risk-averse management is in no one’s best 
interest.113  Although the business judgment rule has limited appli­
cability to shareholder disputes in close corporations, given the 
myriad ways that controlling shareholders can line their own pock­
ets at the expense of minority shareholders,114 the alternative to 
deference need not be the interposition of courts as after-the-fact 
business managers. 
A recent Massachusetts Superior Court case illustrates the 
problem.  In O’Connor v. United States Art Co., the minority share­
holder was “charged with poor bookkeeping practices that left re­
ceivables unaccounted for and payables outstanding” and he was 
terminated.115  Even assuming that “these sloppy practices” had 
been established, the court found that “[t]here clearly were less 
harmful alternatives to firing” the plaintiff and described those al­
ternatives as follows: 
For example, [the corporation’s] controlling group could have . . . 
hired a competent bookkeeper and made [the minority share­
holder] vice president of marketing, with an adjustment in com­
pensation to a modified salary-plus-commission based 
compensation.  Or the company treasurer, who from day one al­
ways was [the majority shareholder], could have acted in a trea­
surer’s function, not simply as a title holder.  Or the stockholders 
could have called a real meeting and discussed among the four of 
them ways and means to correct the bookkeeping issues and still 
preserve a role for [plaintiff] in the international sales aspects of 
the business, in which no one said his skills were lacking.  Indeed, 
there are, this Court is confident, numerous other rational busi­
113. See Stephen M. BAINBRIDGE, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate 
Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 787 (2006) (contending that the business judgment 
rule “is precisely the rule for which shareholders would bargain because they would 
conclude that the systemic costs of judicial review exceed the benefits of punishing di­
rector misfeasance and malfeasance”). 
114. Controlling shareholders have a conflict of interest with respect to deci­
sions—including salaries paid to themselves as employees of the corporation, or direc­
tor’s fees they collect, or other transactions they may cause the corporation to engage 
in—that benefit themselves individually.  In the fiduciary language of corporate govern­
ance, these kinds of decisions implicate the duty of loyalty.  Stephen M. BAINBRIDGE, 
Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
547, 580 N.162 (2003) (“Preventing directors from pursuing their self-interest, of course, 
is the reason corporate law contains a duty of loyalty.”). 
115. O’Connor v. U.S. Art Co., No. 031728BLS, 2005 WL 1812512, at *9 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. June 27, 2005), aff’d 66 Mass. App. Ct. 1118 (2006). 
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ness means for solving the bookkeeping issues short of firing [the 
minority shareholder] and shutting down the business.116 
When courts speculate about alternative choices, and how 
those choices would have worked out, while conceding that the ma­
jority’s actual choice advanced a legitimate business purpose, we 
have more than a departure from the business judgment rule— 
there is a total obliteration of the concept.117  It is one thing to rec­
ognize a duty of loyalty issue and to require the majority to defend 
the entire fairness of a particular decision; it is another to decide 
liability based upon a universe of other possibilities that, viewed 
after the fact, might also have advanced the majority’s purpose.118 
C. What is the Role of Reasonable Expectations? 
Further complicating the application of the Wilkes standard is 
the court’s observation that firing a shareholder employee or “sev­
ering him from a position as an officer or director” might “frustrate 
the minority stockholder’s purposes in entering . . . the corporate 
venture.”119  Although Wilkes indicates that shareholder expecta­
tions are relevant, the court does not make reasonable expectations 
a formal part of its two-part shareholder oppression analysis.120 
The Supreme Judicial Court has suggested recently that reasonable 
expectations analysis is, in fact, a separate inquiry: “A breach of 
116. Id.  My critique here concerns the undefined nature of the Wilkes analysis, 
not the court’s judgment in this case concerning a situation where the parties’ negotia­
tions through counsel toward an amicable separation ended abruptly when the majority 
shareholder decided instead to use its control to terminate the minority’s involvement 
in the business. See id.  For a more questionable result, see Leslie v. Boston Software 
Collaborative, Inc., No. 010268BLS, 2002 WL 532605, at *8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 
2002), in which the court found that less harmful alternatives for dealing with a share­
holder who had alienated coworkers and clients, and who arguably had threatened vio­
lence, included modifying his job description “such that he could have been insulated 
from direct contact with . . . employees” and helping plaintiff “becom[e] more exten­
sively involved in off-site, time-and-materials billing projects.” 
117. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 242 (“[T]he business judgment rule says R 
that courts must defer to the board of director’s judgment absent highly unusual 
exceptions.”). 
118. In this issue, Professor Kleinberger defends the value of Wilkes’s second 
step, because it gives courts the ability to analyze claims of oppression in situations 
where neither party is without fault. See Daniel Kleinberger, Donahue’s Fils Aı̂né: Re­
flections on Wilkes and the Legitimate Rights of Selfish Ownership, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 405 (2011) (“Wilkes is most important when both sides can justifiably point fingers 
at each other.”)  However, this judicial flexibility comes at the cost of considerable un­
certainty in the legal standard. 
119. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662-63 (Mass. 
1976). 
120. Id. at 663-64. 
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fiduciary duty through a freeze-out also occurs when the reasonable 
expectations of a shareholder are frustrated.”121 
If reasonable expectations analysis matters but is not actually 
part of the Wilkes test, then what happens if the reasonable expec­
tations analysis and the Wilkes analysis point in different direc­
tions?  In general, Massachusetts courts seem to require that a 
plaintiff establish oppression under both theories.122  Accordingly, 
after a minority shareholder uses the reasonable expectations the­
ory to allege “a breach of fiduciary duty, the court must allow the 
controlling group to demonstrate a ‘legitimate business purpose for 
its action.’”123  However, if the plaintiff cannot establish a reasona­
ble expectation, then the court will find for the defendant.  As a 
practical matter, reasonable expectations may have become a dis-
positive, threshold analysis.  Thus, it is important to know what 
counts as a reasonable expectation. 
In some cases, the Massachusetts courts have relied upon a 
careful assessment of the parties’ actual, bargained-for expecta­
tions.124  For example, in Merola v. Exergen Corp.,125 the Supreme 
Judicial Court used reasonable expectations analysis to preclude li­
ability even though the plaintiff might have had a colorable argu­
ment for breach of duty under the Wilkes standard.126  The court 
held that the majority shareholder had not violated a fiduciary duty 
by firing the minority shareholder.127  Rather than apply the Wilkes 
121. Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 816 (Mass. 2009) (emphasis added). 
122. See, e.g., Murphy v. Grey, No. 051951B, 2007 WL 3014730, at *6 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2007) (“There can be little doubt that being terminated from the 
corporation of which he was a co-owner and co-founder would frustrate Murphy’s ex­
pectations of the benefits of ownership.  However, to establish that the defendants are 
liable Murphy must show that the defendants acted improperly in some way—i.e., they 
did not have any legitimate business purpose—when they terminated him.”).  One 
court reviewed plaintiff’s claim under both theories, without deciding which analysis 
controls, simply because it could not be sure what Massachusetts law requires. See 
Keating v. Keating, Nos. 00749, 00748 2003 WL 23213143, at *15 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 
3, 2003) (“In the wake of the Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Merola, the proper 
analytical framework for this Court to employ in passing on the merits of [the] freeze-
out claim is not entirely clear.”). 
123. Pointer, 918 N.E.2d at 816. 
124. See, e.g., Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 N.E.2d 351, 354 (Mass. 1996); Hol­
land v. Burke, No. BACV200500122A, 2008 WL 4514664, at *7 (Mass. Super Ct. June 
18, 2008) (holding that plaintiff had not “established that he had a reasonable expecta­
tion of continued employment . . ., that a guaranty of employment was a major reason 
for his investment of capital, or that he was relying on employment by the LLC and two 
corporations for his livelihood”). 
125. Merola, 668 N.E.2d at 354. 
126. Id. at 354. 
127. Id. at 354-55. 
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test, the court focused instead upon the minority shareholder’s lack 
of a reasonable expectation of employment.128  The court acknowl­
edged that the principle of employment at will may conflict with a 
majority shareholder’s “fiduciary duty to the minority interest.”129 
To the extent the majority is obligated to demonstrate a legitimate 
business purpose for conduct that disadvantages a minority share­
holder, it would seem to follow that the employment-at-will doc­
trine is limited when an employee is a minority shareholder. 
Yet, the court declined to apply Wilkes in this fashion and in­
stead distinguished Wilkes on its facts.130  Whereas the plaintiff 
shareholder in Wilkes depended “‘on his salary as the principal re­
turn on his investment,’”131 the court found that “there was no evi­
dence that the corporation distributed all profits to shareholders in 
the form of salaries.”132  More significant, the court concluded that 
the plaintiff’s stock ownership was separate from his employment 
status: 
Here, although the plaintiff invested in the stock of Exergen 
with the reasonable expectation of continued employment, there 
was no general policy regarding stock ownership and employ­
ment, and there was no evidence that any other stockholders had 
expectations of continuing employment because they purchased 
stock.  The investment in the stock was an investment in the eq­
uity of the corporation which was not tied to employment in any 
formal way.  The plaintiff . . . testified that he was induced to 
work for Exergen with the promise that he could become a major 
stockholder.  There was no testimony that he was ever required 
to buy stock as a condition of employment.133 
The court relied upon Wilkes’s statement that the majority 
“‘must have some room to maneuver in establishing the business 
policy of the corporation,’”134 and upheld the employment action 
even though “there was no legitimate business purpose for the ter­
mination of the plaintiff.”135  The court gave significant weight to 
128. Id. The lower court had adopted the jury’s finding that “there was no legiti­
mate business purpose for not continuing the plaintiff’s employment.” Id. at 353. 
129. Id. at 354. 
130. Id. 




134. Id. at 355 (quoting Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663). 
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the fact that “[t]he plaintiff was terminated in accordance with his 
employment contract and fairly compensated for his stock.”136 
In other cases, the Supreme Judicial Court has taken a more 
expansive view of reasonable expectations, highlighting the minor­
ity’s general expectation of benefit from share ownership rather 
than a specific, bargained-for expectation. For example, in Brodie 
v. Jordan,137 the plaintiff complained that the majority shareholders 
excluded her from participation and hindered her ability to sell her 
shares, in part by refusing to perform a valuation of the corporation 
that might have facilitated a sale of her stock to an outside party.138 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower 
court’s judgment of liability and concluded that the court “properly 
analyzed the defendants’ liability in terms of the plaintiff’s reasona­
ble expectations of benefit.”139  The court did not consider whether 
the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation that the corporation 
136. Id.  If Merola has a flaw, it is that the court appears to give total priority to 
the absence of shareholder expectations, even where the defendants lack a business 
justification for their actions.  As an initial matter, the Merola court’s refusal to give any 
weight to the lack of business justification could confuse lower courts into believing that 
the Supreme Judicial Court intended to remove whatever constraints Wilkes imposes 
on judicial discretion. See Keating v. Keating, Nos. 00749, 00748, 2003 WL 23213143, at 
*15 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2003) (“In Merola v. Exergen, Corp., the Supreme Judicial 
Court seemed to eschew the Wilkes ‘legitimate business purpose’ test in favor of an 
inquiry based more on fairness and equity.”).  Also, regardless of the parties’ actual 
expectations, the lack of a legitimate business purpose can evidence oppressive conduct. 
See supra Part I.B.  This is particularly true since trust is what makes closely held busi­
nesses possible, and, with no ability to specify all important contractual terms in ad­
vance, the minority is exposed to the majority’s opportunistic self-dealing.  In other 
words, the fact that the minority shareholders never thought about a particular issue 
does not mean that they consented to the majority’s exploitation of its power to their 
disadvantage. 
137. Brodie v. Jordan, 857 N.E.2d 1076, 1080 (Mass. 2006). 
138. See id. at 1078-79 (“[T]he plaintiff asked [defendants] to perform a valuation 
of the company so that she could ascertain the value of her shares, but such a valuation 
was never performed.”). 
139. Id. at 1080.  In remanding the case, the court stated that the award of a 
buyout was not appropriate because “it placed the plaintiff in a significantly better posi­
tion than she would have enjoyed absent the wrongdoing, and well exceeded her rea­
sonable expectations of benefit from her shares.” Id. at 1081.  Although the Brodie 
court held that reasonable expectations “analysis is useful at both the liability and rem­
edy stages of freeze-out litigation,” id. at 1080, it appeared to assess those two kinds of 
expectations differently.  For purposes of liability, what mattered was the plaintiff’s gen­
eral expectation that she would benefit from owning stock. Id.  In awarding a remedy, 
though, the court observed that there was “nothing in the background law, the gov­
erning rules of this particular close corporation, or any other circumstance that could 
have given the plaintiff a reasonable expectation of having her shares bought out.” Id. 
at 1081.  Thus, the court studied the parties’ actual bargain to limit the remedy but not 
to decide liability. Id. 
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would, at its own expense, perform a valuation simply to allow her 
to sell her shares.  Indeed, absent some explicitly bargained for pro­
vision, it is hard to see why a shareholder would expect the corpora­
tion to undertake such an expense.140 
In sum, a defendant’s ability to avoid liability under reasonable 
expectations analysis may depend upon whether the court chooses 
to enforce the minority’s general expectation that it will benefit 
from its stock ownership, regardless of the specific circumstances, 
or whether the court instead seeks to ascertain whether the parties’ 
actual bargain governs the matter at issue.  In particular, a focus on 
the parties’ specific bargain will constrain the minority’s ability to 
recover if the minority had no specific expectation one way or the 
other with respect to the matter at issue.141 
As discussed in the next Part, reasonable expectations analysis 
has great promise for improving the fiduciary approach to claims of 
shareholder oppression.  By assessing the parties’ understood bar­
gain, courts can prevent majority shareholders from opportunisti­
cally abusing their control to deprive minority shareholders of the 
reasonable expectations that motivated their investment.  Also, 
consideration of the parties’ bargain—interpreted broadly to en­
compass the overall structure of their relationship—would limit the 
minority’s ability to use litigation to rewrite the terms of the deal in 
its own favor.  Greater reliance on shareholder expectations analy­
sis would advance Wilkes’s goal of providing a measured structure 
for fiduciary analysis, balancing the majority’s right to pursue legiti­
mate business purposes with a strong duty of loyalty owed to vul­
nerable minority shareholders.142 
IV. PROTECTING THE PARTIES’ BARGAIN 
Despite Wilkes’s flaws, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court is not likely to abandon the signature fiduciary approach to 
140. Put in terms of the Wilkes test, there would appear to be a legitimate busi­
ness purpose for declining to perform a valuation exercise solely for the benefit of a 
minority stockholder. 
141. Conversely, if the parties have an actual bargain with respect to a particular 
issue, such as minority employment, the majority cannot contravene that understanding 
simply by citing a legitimate business purpose.  For instance, even if it would be cheaper 
for the business to replace the minority shareholder with an employee willing to work 
for lower wages, those cost savings would not ordinarily justify the termination of the 
minority shareholder’s employment. 
142. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976) 
(stating that “courts must weigh the legitimate business purpose, if any, against the 
practicability of a less harmful alternative”). 
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shareholder oppression it has developed over the last thirty-five 
years; fortunately, no radical change is needed. Wilkes contains the 
DNA for a more bargain-focused approach to oppression because it 
highlights the problem that majority exclusion of the minority may 
“effectively frustrate the minority stockholder’s purposes in enter­
ing on the corporate venture.”143  In more recent cases, like Merola, 
the court has used reasonable expectations analysis to identify and 
enforce the parties’ actual bargain.144 
By situating shareholder oppression analysis within the context 
of the parties’ contractual relationship, the reasonable expectations 
inquiry would help Massachusetts courts apply a more tempered 
version of fiduciary duty—consistent with Wilkes’s purpose—with­
out resting liability judgments entirely on a see-saw between two 
under-defined concepts: legitimate business purpose and reasona­
ble alternatives.  Minority shareholder protection can be under­
stood as an extension of contract theory, providing a constraint 
against opportunistic action by the majority that violates the par­
ties’ reasonable expectations in entering into a long-term 
relationship.145 
Under Wilkes, the key question is whether the majority has a 
legitimate business purpose, but it should also matter whether the 
majority has acted in accord with the parties’ basic agreement— 
both to prevent the minority from claiming an entitlement to bene­
fits it bargained away and to prevent the majority from violating 
mutually understood expectations in the name of business expedi­
ence.  Thus, contract theory helps explain what makes an expecta­
tion “reasonable,” and reasonable expectations analysis can 
establish a boundary for fiduciary duty.146 
143. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663. 
144. Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 N.E.2d 351, 354-55 (Mass. 1996). 
145. Close corporations are quintessential relational contracts. The founding 
shareholders negotiate a long-term, open-ended relationship with each other for the 
general purpose of operating a profitable business. See Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder 
Oppression & Reasonable Expectations: Of Change, Gifts, and Inheritances in Close 
Corporation Disputes, 86 MINN. L. REV. 717, 756 (2002) (“[T]he investment bargains 
entered into by close corporation shareholders reflect the characteristics of relational 
contracts.”). 
146. On some accounts, this version of reasonable expectations analysis may dif­
fer from a true fiduciary approach. See, e.g., LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE  RISE OF THE 
UNCORPORATION 166 (2010) (“[C]ontrolling shareholders should not have fiduciary du­
ties to noncontrolling shareholders. . . .  [T]he law need only constrain opportunism by 
holding the controller to its express or implied contractual obligations, including the 
duty of good faith . . . .”).  However, at least in Massachusetts, bargain analysis has 
become increasingly central to defining the shareholders’ fiduciary duty: Wilkes identi­
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A. The Contractual Approach 
Through the rubric of objectively reasonable expectations, 
courts can account for the interests of all shareholders.  Accord­
ingly, the parties’ fiduciary duties to one another should be under­
stood in context; they have chosen to enter a business venture and 
have voluntarily undertaken certain obligations.  By its nature, a 
long-term agreement to own and operate a corporate venture can­
not be fully specified in advance.147  When the intention is to estab­
lish a relationship more than a discrete bargain, this open texture is, 
in fact, part of the agreement.148  Through the mechanism of major­
ity control, provided as part of the default rules of corporate law, 
the corporation retains the ability to adapt.149  However, should the 
majority take opportunistic advantage of its control to exclude the 
minority from the value of the corporation—conduct that the mi­
nority would never have agreed to at a hypothetical bargaining ta­
ble and that lies far outside the parties’ objectively reasonable 
expectations at the time of investment—the majority would act in 
contravention of the equitable duty of good faith and fair dealing 
implied as a term in every contract.150 
Shareholder oppression law, therefore, involves the enforce­
ment of the parties’ reasonable expectations.  Actions that violate 
the reasonable expectations of the parties will also breach the im­
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in every con­
tract.151  The enforcement of expectations is not limited to a narrow 
interpretation of the parties’ literal contract.  Rather, courts should 
identify and enforce the parties’ central understanding, their bar­
gain, even assuming the bargain is unwritten and would not be defi­
fied the importance of shareholder expectations and subsequent Massachusetts cases 
have focused upon the parties’ actual bargain in assessing those expectations. See supra 
Parts I.B, III.A-C. 
147. See Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation Contract: 
A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 216, 216 (1992) (“Viewed contractu­
ally, the typical closely held corporation is mostly gaps.”). 
148. When all important issues cannot be resolved ahead of time, rational parties 
may substitute equitable obligations for detailed contract terms. See Easterbrook & 
Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, supra note 34, at 427. R 
149. See O’Kelley, supra note 147, at 225 (“[W]hile contractual specification of R 
rights and duties may provide protection against opportunistic withdrawal, the parties 
may also incur significant costs from lost flexibility.”). 
150. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979); O’Kelley, supra 
note 147, at 222 (“Opportunistic actors seek to extract an advantage which would be R 
denied them if the party with whom they deal had full information.”). 
151. See Means, A Contractual Approach, supra note 11, at 41. R 
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nite enough to enforce under conventional contract doctrine.152 
Fiduciary duty may prohibit other forms of overreaching—the pros­
pects for self-dealing are limited only by the imagination of control­
ling shareholders—but “good faith” and other well-accepted 
equitable contract principles offer useful guidelines for the protec­
tion of minority shareholders in close corporations. 
B. Reasonable Expectations in Massachusetts 
Recent Massachusetts case law shows the utility of a contrac­
tual approach to shareholder oppression.153  Compare, for example, 
the court’s use of reasonable expectations analysis in O’Brien v. 
Pearson with the court’s application of the standard Wilkes test.154 
In O’Brien, the court found that the majority had breached its fidu­
ciary duty to the minority shareholder by failing to follow through 
on its promise to fund a development project.155  The minority 
shareholder, O’Brien, was a builder and had solicited the majority 
shareholders’ participation in a venture that involved acquiring dis­
tressed properties from a bankrupt developer and completing the 
construction of the buildings in order to eventually bring them to 
the market for sale.156  Although this was the parties’ original un­
derstanding, the majority shareholders decided to turn a quick and 
handsome profit by allowing a third party to satisfy the outstanding 
mortgages and to take on the risk of development.157 
On a broad expectation of benefit, everyone had done well, but 
the controlling shareholders had not held to the original business 
plan.158  Therefore, the most direct way of assessing liability was to 
determine whether the parties had an enforceable bargain and, if 
so, whether the majority shareholders violated the bargain, depriv­
ing the minority shareholder of his objectively reasonable expecta­
tions.159  Had the investors made their low risk tolerance known, 
152. Douglas Moll points out that “[a]lthough both oppression precedents and 
contract precedents base their decisions on breached ‘agreements’ and ‘understandings’ 
between the parties, it is clear that different meanings are ascribed to these terms.” 
Moll, Reasonable Expectations v. Implied-in-Fact Contracts, supra note 11, at 1066. R 
Moll concludes that “it is fair to assert that oppression law is doing what contract law 
should be doing if contract law took a broader perspective when identifying and enforc­
ing bargains.” Id. at 1073. 
153. See, e.g., Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 N.E.2d 351 (Mass. 1996). 
154. See O’Brien v. Pearson, 868 N.E.2d 118, 125-26 (Mass. 2007). 
155. Id. at 126. 
156. Id. at 121. 
157. Id. at 123-24. 
158. Id. at 126. 
159. Id. 
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O’Brien might have found other backers; a quick profit for the in­
vestors may have meant the loss, from O’Brien’s perspective, of a 
once-in-a-lifetime business opportunity.160  Despite the lack of mea­
surable damages,161 the majority’s ignored promise to fund the de­
velopment project arguably breached an agreement among the 
shareholders that the majority shareholders would provide funding 
until completion of the project. 
The court provides just this kind of contractual analysis in re­
jecting the “argument that O’Brien could not compel [the defend­
ants] to invest their own money.”162  As the court observes, the 
defendants’ objection “misses the point.”163  The parties had a 
bargain: 
The defendants’ breach did not arise from their failure to 
purchase the entire subdivision, but rather it occurred when they 
unilaterally decided, after promising to fund the project to the 
extent that it was economically feasible, to turn away from pur­
suit of the agreed-on objective in favor of their preferred 
alternative.164 
By analyzing the parties’ reasonable expectations in terms of 
their actual bargain, the court can explain why O’Brien has a claim 
“despite over-all profits to the corporation and, derivatively, 
O’Brien.”165 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 129.  The minority shareholder suffered no damages because the even­
tual outcome of the development project was uncertain, while the majority’s alternative 
course—obtaining an essentially risk free, four-fold return on its investment—was 
shared with him. Id. at 128-29. 
162. Id. at 126. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Id.  The calculation of damages is, of course, another matter.  Having af­
firmed the liability judgment, however, the court rejected the award of $900,000 in dam­
ages. Id. at 129.  Instead, the court relied upon Brodie’s holding “that the appropriate 
remedy ‘should, to the extent possible, restore to the minority shareholder those bene­
fits which [he] reasonably expected, but has not received because of the fiduciary 
breach.’” Id. at 128 (citing Brodie v. Jordan, 857 N.E.2d 1076, 1080 (Mass. 2006)). The 
court held that plaintiff had not established damages, because the profits that might 
have been achieved had the project been seen through to completion were too specula­
tive. Id. at 128-29.  O’Brien hoped that the project would succeed, but he could not 
reasonably expect as much. Id. at 129.  Although the court remanded for further pro­
ceedings on the issue of damages, it sent a strong signal that plaintiff’s recovery would 
be the “forty-eight per cent of the mortgage discharge proceeds” he would receive in 
the ordinary course, since he would have to forego that recovery in order to pursue a 
different damages theory. See id. at 130 n.13. 
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE207.txt unknown Seq: 31 27-SEP-11 9:51 
2011] THE VACUITY OF WILKES 463 
The court’s holding that defendants were also liable under the 
two-part Wilkes test is much less convincing.  Indeed, the Wilkes 
test makes it very difficult to capture the key point that the defend­
ants promised to do one thing in order to join the venture and in­
stead did something else entirely.  Applying the Wilkes test, the 
court acknowledged that obtaining a relatively high, risk free return 
on an investment rather than gambling on a real estate venture’s 
long-term success was a legitimate business purpose.166 
Because the defendants easily satisfied the first step of the 
Wilkes analysis, the court, if it meant to hold the defendants liable, 
had to find that there was “a reasonably practicable alternative 
course” that would have been less harmful to the minority’s inter­
ests.167  Yet, O’Brien suffered no financial injury—he shared in the 
profit from sale of the property and the possibility of greater profits 
was speculative.168  The court reasoned that the “alternative course 
would have included a more open, communicative, and inclusive 
manner of engagement between the defendants and O’Brien”169 
but failed to offer any support for a finding that funding the devel­
opment project would have improved O’Brien’s financial 
position.170 
Thus, reasonable expectations analysis seems closer to our in­
tuitions about why majority conduct may oppress the minority.  As 
O’Brien also illustrates, there remains the issue of reconciling the 
reasonable expectations approach to shareholder oppression with 
the two-part Wilkes test.  According to Professors Moll and 
Ragazzo, Merola stands for the proposition, applicable across juris­
dictions, that there is a threshold test that a plaintiff’s claim must 
satisfy: 
When the minority asserts that he has been deprived of employ­
ment or some other non-traditional shareholder benefit, how­
ever, his burden of proving that his shareholder rights have been 
harmed is satisfied only by showing that, in the corporation at 
issue, the benefit was part of his rights as a shareholder.171 
166. Id. at 126. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 128-29. 
169. Id. at 126. 
170. The only harm to weigh against the majority’s legitimate business purpose 
was O’Brien’s exclusion from participation, but it is awkward to characterize the pro­
cess of making a decision as an alternative to the decision itself. 
171. MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 41, at 7-64. R 
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On this view, if a minority shareholder could not expect a ben­
efit simply by virtue of share ownership, the minority must show 
that a bargain existed among the shareholders concerning that 
benefit.172 
Reasonable expectations analysis can also be extended beyond 
non-traditional benefits, since even core benefits, such as dividends, 
are subject to the discretion of the board of directors (and thus con­
trolled by the majority shareholders).  A minority shareholder has 
no automatic right to dividends but should be permitted to argue on 
the facts, including course-of-performance evidence, that the share­
holders had an agreement to distribute corporate revenue as divi­
dends.  Perhaps, therefore, reasonable expectations should always 
be the threshold inquiry in a shareholder oppression case.  In 
Wilkes, the plaintiff’s expectation as a founding investor and full 
participant in a business idea he had generated was continued em­
ployment and an equal return.173  In fact, the threshold, contractual 
inquiry seems conclusive.174 
V. WILKES REVISITED 
If shareholder oppression law, properly understood, involves 
nothing more than identifying and enforcing the parties’ actual bar­
gain, then reasonable expectations analysis is more than a threshold 
inquiry—it comprehensively resolves any conceivable claim of op­
pression.  For that to be true, though, it must be the case that all the 
values at stake in a claim of shareholder oppression are, at bottom, 
contractual values.175  If so, then the Wilkes test is not just vacuous 
as a descriptive matter but also normatively undesirable and, in­
deed, irrelevant. 
This single-value approach may explain why the Delaware Su­
preme Court dismissed the need for a doctrine of shareholder op­
172. In Massachusetts, notwithstanding Moll and Ragazzo’s cogent analysis, it re­
mains unclear whether expectations analysis constitutes a threshold inquiry, and, if so, 
whether it is dispositive or merely instructive. 
173. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 660-61 (Mass. 
1976). 
174. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 820 (“[T]his case could have been de- R 
cided as a simple breach of contract.”). 
175. This claim is consistent with the view that the corporation is a nexus of con­
tracts. See Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims:  Obligations to 
Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1266, 1266 (1999) (“[A]ccording to the law and economics perspective that the 
nexus-of-contracts approach to corporate law exemplifies, one should view the corpora­
tion as a ‘complex set of explicit and implicit contracts.’” (citation omitted)). 
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pression on the ground that “[t]he tools of good corporate practice 
. . . give a purchasing minority stockholder the opportunity to bar­
gain for protection before parting with consideration.”176  Accord­
ing to law and economics, market logic explains a wide variety of 
social choices, including those that have an explicitly ethical dimen­
sion; for example, how much environmental protection do we wish 
to purchase?  Is the cost of preventing the accident cheaper than 
the harm prevented, accounting also for the likelihood of the 
harm?177 And so on.  The economic perspective is “monistic” be­
cause it posits one value—economic efficiency—as the measuring 
stick for social choice.178  On this view, the only question we need 
to ask to resolve a shareholder oppression claim is whether the ma­
jority’s action violated either the background rules of corporate law 
or a bargained-for provision in the articles of incorporation, by­
laws, or shareholder agreement.179 
For value pluralists, however, no single value exists against 
which all other ethical choices can be measured.180  Rather, we are 
often forced to choose among values, not because we are maximiz­
ing some greater value (like economic efficiency), but because our 
most fundamental priorities are not consistent and cannot all be re­
alized.181 The values are incommensurable.  Even if we could as­
sign a price to environmental protection, for instance by studying 
the “revealed preferences” of consumers’ willingness to pay more 
for environmentally friendly products, “the assumption of commen­
surability does a kind of conceptual violence to the underlying val­
176. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993); see also Dalley, supra 
note 35, at 222 (“Controlling stockholders’ fiduciary duties are a judicial invention stim- R 
ulated by a desire to provide relief to minority stockholders who later regretted their 
own or their decedent’s bargains . . .”). 
177. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 167–71 (7th ed. 2007). 
178. Id. at 19 (“Economists can usually appeal to a generally accepted goal, such 
as maximizing the value of output, rather than having to defend the goal.”).  According 
to standard economic reasoning, economic efficiency follows when individuals engage 
in non-coerced market transactions to satisfy their own preferences. See, e.g., RICHARD 
A. EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM 42 (2003). 
179. See, e.g., Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1380 (“One could bargain for definitive provi­
sions of self-ordering permitted to a Delaware corporation through the certificate of 
incorporation or by-laws” or “enter into definitive stockholder agreements, and such 
agreements may provide for elaborate earnings tests, buy-out provisions, voting trusts, 
or other voting agreements.”). 
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ues, converting genuine qualitative differences into merely 
quantitative ones.”182 
The initial payoff for applying value pluralism theory to share­
holder oppression law is that it explains why Massachusetts courts 
might hold, despite the apparent contradiction, that majority share­
holders have a right of selfish ownership and a duty of utmost loy­
alty. In Massachusetts (and elsewhere), courts appear to recognize 
conflicting values and, depending on the facts of particular cases, 
give fuller effect to certain values at the expense of other values at 
stake in a particular dispute.183  To the extent shareholder oppres­
sion law is value pluralistic, it may be unfair to criticize Wilkes for 
giving weight to competing, sometimes irreconcilable values.184 
The shareholder oppression’s context-specific nature eludes easy 
categorization. 
Value pluralism may also explain some subtler aspects of 
Wilkes’s efforts to accommodate inconsistent principles.  On a 
value-pluralist view, for instance, the Wilkes court’s insistence that 
the majority at least “consider” that its action would “disregard . . . 
long-standing policy” is interesting because it places emphasis on 
the process of choosing rather than the choice itself.185  Where plu­
ral values are at stake and there is no axiomatically correct way to 
proceed, one response is to focus instead on improving decision-
making by ensuring that all relevant perspectives and values are 
182. Bruce Chapman, Law, Incommensurability, and Conceptually Sequenced Ar­
gument, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1487, 1488 (1998). 
183. Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc., 541 S.E.2d 257, 266 (S.C. 2001) 
(“We find . . . that the terms ‘oppressive’ and ‘unfairly prejudicial’ are elastic terms 
whose meaning varies with the circumstances presented in a particular case.”). The 
point can be overstated, though.  For example, enforcing the equitable duty of good 
faith and fair dealing can sometimes advance the parties’ autonomy interests in that it 
requires them to live up to the bargain they actually understood, even if opportunistic 
exploitation of contractual incompleteness later tempts the stronger party. See Means, 
A Contractual Approach, supra note 11.  Even so, we cannot assume that vindicating R 
autonomy interests in a particular case will always advance equitable good faith con­
cerns and vice versa. 
184. The problem of competing values has been recognized in other areas of law. 
For instance, a number of scholars have argued against unitary theories of tort law. See, 
e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Traditional Versus Economic Analysis: Evidence from 
Cardozo and Posner Torts Opinions, 62 FLA. L. REV. 667, 676-77 (2010) (describing 
tension between “social wealth or utility maximization” and “corrective justice”); Chris­
topher J. Robinette, Torts Rationales, Pluralism, and Isaiah Berlin, 14 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 329, 330. 360 (2007) (advocating a value pluralistic approach to tort law); Gary T. 
Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Jus­
tice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1802, 1818 (1997) (advocating, on practical grounds, that tort 
law accommodate conflicting values). 
185. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 664 (Mass. 1976). 
467 
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aired in a fully deliberative process.186  In Wilkes, consistent with 
value pluralism, the focus on considered choice suggests that legiti­
macy cannot be assessed solely based on economic impact. 
Subsequent Massachusetts courts have highlighted the pres­
ence or absence of a reasoned decision-making process.  In 
O’Brien, for instance, the court noted that “pursuing a risk-averse 
effort to recoup the initial investment with some return” was a 
“narrower” objective than that originally contemplated by the par­
ties but still within the range of “legitimate.”187  However, in light 
of the minority’s strong objection, “[a] reasonably practicable alter­
native course would have included a more open, communicative, 
and inclusive manner of engagement between the defendants and 
O’Brien.  Without such a dialogue, the corporate sea change that 
occurred . . . could be interpreted by the jury as a breach of fiduci­
ary duty.”188  In Pointer, the court approved the lower court’s find­
ing that the other shareholders “owed [plaintiff], who was a forty-
three per cent owner . . . , real substance and communication, in­
cluding efforts to resolve supposed complaints by less drastic mea­
sures than termination.  But such efforts never truly were 
attempted.”189  Thus, the same decision might be acceptable if 
made after a properly noticed meeting and on the basis of full infor­
mation, including minority shareholder participation. 
Alternatively, courts might treat evidence that the minority 
was walled off from a decision as reason to worry about disingenu­
ous business purposes advanced by the majority after the fact.190 
This seems more plausible than offering process as a direct alterna­
tive to a given business decision.  I have previously argued that mi­
nority shareholder “voice” should matter in oppression cases, not as 
a substantive right—unless bargained for as such—but as possible 
evidence of the good faith of the controlling shareholders, and that 
186. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE  PROBLEM OF  FREE  SPEECH 
241 (1993) (stating that the “American constitutional system” is designed “to ensure 
discussion and debate among people who are genuinely different in their perspectives 
and position, in the interest of creating a process through which reflection will en­
courage the emergence of general truths”). 
187. O’Brien v. Pearson, 868 N.E.2d 118, 126 (Mass. 2007). 
188. Id. 
189. Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 818 (Mass. 2009) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also O’Connor v. U.S. Art Co., No. 031728BLS, 2005 WL 1812512 
(Mass. Super. Ct. June 27, 2005). 
190. Of course, a savvy majority could use the appearance of process to provide 
cover for decisions it already intended to make, but that objection can be made with 
respect to any decision that relies upon deliberation among interested parties and that 
requires a modicum of good faith. 
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courts should more closely scrutinize cases where the minority 
shareholder has been cut out of the decision-making process.191  As 
in O’Brien, the exclusion of a participant may indicate that the con­
trolling shareholders have decided to turn the venture to their own 
advantage, regardless of the expectations of the minority.192 
Also, if the values at stake in shareholder oppression litigation 
can be arranged logically according to relative priority, we can 
structure the court’s decision sequence to reflect those priorities 
without excluding values or making a single value decisive.  Profes­
sor Bruce Chapman has described this as a “conceptually se­
quenced” argument.193  The Wilkes test establishes priorities—first, 
the majority must show a legitimate business purpose, second, the 
minority must establish reasonable alternatives—but does not give 
the first value absolute priority over the second.194  If the majority 
cannot show a legitimate purpose, the court need not consider 
whether another, less-harmful approach was possible.  However, if 
the parties can establish, respectively, a business purpose and some 
plausible alternatives, the court will assess the strength of the alter­
natives in light of the proffered purpose.195 
Understood as a conceptually sequenced analysis, Wilkes 
makes sense.  If the controlling shareholders do not have a good 
business reason for what they have done, it seems odd to ask 
whether there was a less drastic way of doing it.  Logic defers con­
sideration of the alternatives until the appropriateness of the origi­
nal choice has been established.196  Thus, Wilkes’s conceptual 
sequencing can be defended as a rational response to incommensu­
rability.  To complete the Wilkes test, reasonable expectations 
should be considered a threshold, non-dispositive but shaping in­
quiry—giving us a three-part test.  Reasonable expectations, in 
191. See Means, A Voice-Based Framework, supra note 7, at 1218-19. R 
192. At the same time, majority shareholders have the right and the ability to 
decide contested questions as they see fit, so long as they do not oppress the minority. 
193. Chapman, supra note 182, at 1515. R 
194. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 
1976). 
195. Id. 
196. For much the same reason, the criminal law concept of “excuse” cannot be 
evaluated until it has been determined whether a crime was committed. See Chapman, 
supra note 182, at 1515 (“For the notion of an excuse is an essentially (conceptually) R 
sequenced idea; without a prior act of wrongdoing, there is nothing for which the actor 
can be held responsible, and no issue, therefore, to which an excuse could possibly have 
any sensible application.” (citing George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 949, 960 (1985))). 
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other words, should not be accorded total, lexical priority over all 
other values identified in Wilkes. 
Without overturning existing case law, the Massachusetts Su­
preme Judicial Court could clarify that shareholder expectations 
analysis is a threshold but non-dispositive inquiry.197  If the minor­
ity shareholders can establish a particular expectation, then that ex­
pectation should only be defeasible upon a very strong showing of 
business need.198  However, if the minority shareholders have no 
relevant expectation, then a correspondingly weaker business pur­
pose would suffice.199  Viewed this way, shareholder expectations 
analysis would neither be separate from the Wilkes test nor a re­
placement for it. 
CONCLUSION 
Imagine if Justice Cardozo had issued a second opinion for the 
New York Court of Appeals to explain what he meant when he 
stated in Meinhard v. Salmon that fiduciary duty demands the 
“punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.”200  If Cardozo had writ­
ten a companion decision describing what the “punctilio” requires, 
and demystifying Meinhard’s other rhetorical chestnuts,201 we 
might have something like the relation of Donahue and Wilkes— 
the spiritual leader and the pragmatic acolyte. 
Yet, as this Article has demonstrated, pragmatism is hard won. 
The Wilkes test does not clarify Donahue so much as it raises new 
questions.  Viewed skeptically, Massachusetts’ fiduciary standard 
contains many strands and offers support for almost any result. 
There is, however, no reason to doubt the sincerity with which Mas­
sachusetts courts have applied the Wilkes standard or that the 
courts believe that they are doing anything other than resolving 
197. This diaphanous approach would help clarify the relationship of reasonable 
expectations and the Wilkes test as discussed supra Part III.C. 
198. To be clear, I am not referring to explicit contractual arrangements, which 
would still be enforced subject to any equitable exceptions that might apply within con­
tract law. 
199. For instance, if second or third generation shareholders who had never 
worked for the business applied for a management position, the majority would need 
little reason to decline. 
200. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
201. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, The Story of Meinhard v. Salmon: Fiduciary 
Duty’s Punctilio, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES, supra note 65, at 106, 120 (“The opinion R 
is one of Cardozo’s most eloquent.  He paints with a broad brush, setting out high moral 
aspirations.”). 
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shareholder oppression cases consistent with a principled view of 
fiduciary duty. 
If Massachusetts’ explication of the fiduciary approach appears 
to have serious shortcomings that can be traced back to Wilkes, it 
suggests that we either need a different approach to the problem of 
shareholder oppression or another way of understanding the work 
that courts do in these kinds of cases.  Perhaps fiduciary duty in 
Justice Cardozo’s grand style is too lofty and we should fix our gaze 
on something closer to home and more attainable, like an under­
standing of the parties’ bargain rooted in relational contract theory. 
Or perhaps a non-reductive approach to minority-shareholder op­
pression will necessarily include a number of values that are in ten­
sion with one another, that cannot be arranged into a final 
framework, and that can only be adjusted case by case. 
